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NOTES
A REMEDY FOR ABORTION SEEKERS UNDER THE
INVASION OF PRIVACY TORT*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court articulated the right
to an abortion as a fundamental constitutional privacy right in
Roe v. Wade.' The Court stated, "[t]his right of privacy, whether
it be found in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action.., or... in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."2 The Court thus defined the
constitutional privacy right encompassing abortion as a
woman's right to be free from governmental interference in
reproductive choice.
In exercising this right, some abortion clinic clients, or
"abortion seekers," have been photographed by anti-abortion
protestors in the vicinity of clinics. Anti-abortion protestors
have posted some of those photographs on the Internet. One
such protestor, Neal Horsley, maintains a website on which he
posts the names of abortion providers and clinic workers.
3
Recently, he expanded his Internet publication to include
photographs and videotape footage of abortion clinic clients.4
The footage is organized by geographic area, so that, for
example, someone from New York can locate in one click of the
©2002 Rachel L. Braunstein. All Rights Reserved.
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153.
3 Horsley's main website is http://www.christiangallery.com.
4 See Kimberly Hula, U. Missouri: Controversial Anti-Abortion Web Site
Adds Video, U-WIRE, Aug. 21, 2001; see also Julia Duin, Culture, et Cetera, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2001, at A2.
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mouse all the images of women seeking abortions at New York
clinics. 5 In interviews, Horsley stated that publishing the
photographs and videotapes "expose[s] the reality of legalized
abortion to the American people, show[s] people up close
exactly what's going on in the thing we call legalized
abortion .... What we [anti-abortion protestors] do have access
to [are] the... images of the people who are going in and out of
these baby butcher shops."6 Horsley's stated purpose in
publicizing images of abortion clinic clients is to dissuade
women from obtaining abortions.7
This Note argues that abortion clinic clients who are
targets of certain protest conduct, such as being photographed
or videotaped, have a remedy under the invasion of privacy
tort. The principle of a general right to privacy arising under
tort law originated in Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis's decisive Harvard Law Review article, The Right to
Privacy.8 In particular, this Note argues that abortion seekers
may recover under the branches of the privacy tort entitled
public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion
as described by Dean Prosser in his article Privacy9 and
subsequently adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.10
Alleging that the activity of anti-abortion protestors invades an
abortion seeker's privacy is significant because the claim
describes an abortion as a private matter. Privacy can be
experienced as non-disclosure of information or physical
seclusion, forms of inaccessibility to others. This Note asserts
that privacy possesses a positive value insofar as it promotes
autonomy. It follows that formulating a civil remedy for
abortion seekers under the invasion of privacy tort defends
reproductive autonomy. Although common law and
constitutional privacy are not to be equated in the abortion
r See Yochi J. Dreazen, In the Shadows: Photos of Women Who Get Abortions
Go Up on Internet, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2002, at Al. See also Robyn Blumner,
'Abortioncams' Well Within the Law, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 11, 2001, at 13A.
6 Alan Colmes, One-on-One with Neal Horsley, FOX NEWS: HANNITY &
COLMES, June 4, 2001; see also Dennis B. Roddy, Fugitive's Threats Stir the Prayerful
Abortion Clinics on Alert, As is His Family After Counterthreats on the Internet,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, June 24, 2001, at Al.
7 See Carol Anne Douglas & Clare-Marie Myers, Anti-Women's Lives Website
Gets Worse, OFF OUR BACKS, July 1, 2001, at 3.
8 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis].
9 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
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context, aspects of the protection given to personal privacy in
abortion rights cases are illustrative in advocating for abortion
seekers' right to common law privacy.
Part I of this Note first explores the history of the
invasion of privacy tort. It then defines privacy in terms of
autonomy and discusses informational and physical
inaccessibility as conditions of personal privacy. Additionally,
Part I analyzes constitutional privacy jurisprudence concerning
abortion rights and concludes that notions of personal privacy
and autonomy under constitutional law are useful to this
discussion of common law privacy. Part II outlines the public
disclosure cause of action and relies on analogies to medical
and sexual privacy in order to conceptualize abortion as a
private fact. Furthermore, this Part addresses the First
Amendment implications of the tort action and concludes that
the identity of an abortion clinic client and the fact of her
abortion are non-newsworthy. Part III analyzes the potential
intrusion upon seclusion tort action in the context of abortion.
Moreover, this Part advocates for abortion seekers' right to
public privacy in the vicinity of family planning clinics. Finally,
this Note concludes by recommending that the legal community
recognize remedies for abortion seekers under the public
disclosure and intrusion upon seclusion torts, invoking the
common law right to privacy in order to promote reproductive
self-determination.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITION OF THE INVASION OF
PRIVACY TORT
A remedy for abortion clinic clients under the invasion
of privacy tort is significant in light of the unique, social
qualities of tort law. "Tort law is specifically intended to allow
individual citizens not only to have a remedy for wrongs
endured and harms suffered but also to influence the way in
which individuals in the broader community interact with each
other and in society."" With respect to common law privacy
rights, the potential effect of tort law on social relationships is
evident. One scholar notes, the common law tort of invasion of
privacy "safeguards rules of civility" by creating a "'ritual
" Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the Common-Law
Protection for Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 545 (advocating for
protection of women's reproductive autonomy by adopting a patient-centered standard
under "procreative torts" such as wrongful birth and wrongful abortion).
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idiom" which, in giving an individual the "ability to choose
respect or intimacy, is deeply empowering for his sense of
himself as an independent or autonomous person."12 The
expression of the way in which respectful personal distance
advances the right to individuality and autonomy within the
language of privacy underscores a meaningful function of the
common law right to privacy.
The notion of a common law right to privacy was
introduced formally in Warren and Brandeis's seminal article,
The Right to Privacy.3 Their article purportedly responded to
the encroachment of journalistic innovations on private life and
criticized the press for "overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency."4 Specifically, the
authors noted that "[r]ecent inventions and business methods"
such as "[ilnstantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to
make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet
shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." 5
The authors described the right to privacy as the "right
to be let alone .... ",,16 Warren and Brandeis espoused a "general
right to privacy "17 for which they found support in existing legal
doctrine:
If the invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria, the elements for
demanding redress exist, since already the value of mental suffering,
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 959, 973 (1989).
13 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8.
14 Id. at 196.
L5 Id. at 195. This description, in effect, characterizes the growth of "yellow
journalism" to which the authors were said to have responded. See Prosser, supra note
9, at 383. But see James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 13
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 907 (1979) (discrediting the claimed roots of Warren and
Brandeis's article and suggesting that "the origin of the ... article lies to a great extent
in the hypersensitivity of the patrician lawyer-merchant [Warren] and the verbal
facility and ideological ambivalence of his friend and former law partner [Brandeis]").
Specifically, Barron suggests that Warren's hypersensitivity was a response to the
press coverage of his private family affairs. Id. at 902.
16 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)); see also Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (regarding wire tapping of
individuals' phones, stating that the framers of the United States Constitution granted
individuals "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men").
17 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 198.
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caused by an act wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for
compensation.18
The authors also described the right to privacy as
"spiritual." They thus distinguished it from "the wrongs and
correlative rights recognized by the law of slander and libel
[which] are in their nature material rather than spiritual" in
that the injury to reputation materially affects one's
interactions with others.19 Warren and Brandeis asserted that
the general right to privacy with which their article was
concerned underlay the common law principles of intellectual
and artistic property. In this area, "[tihe common law secures
to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others."2° Thus, the authors advocated for
self-determination in conducting and protecting one's private
affairs. They concluded by asking rhetorically, "[shall] the
courts thus close the front entrance to constituted authority,
and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?"2'
Notwithstanding Warren and Brandeis's enthusiastic
advocacy, a long period of indecision in the legal community
followed publication of the article as to the significance and
scope of common law privacy.
The modern definition of the tort can be understood
through its later interpretation in legal scholarship. In
Privacy,' Dean Prosser reviewed the tort's development in
judicial opinions issued in the seventy years since its inception
in Warren and Brandeis's journal article. He asserted that the
privacy tort represented invasions into four discrete interests
which were linked only by a shared name and their common
view toward redressing interference with the plaintiffs right
"to be let alone."2' Prosser labeled the four types of invasions:
18 Id. at 213.
19 Id. at 197; see also Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1002 (1964) (positing that
Warren and Brandeis's right to privacy implicated "a spiritual interest" in one's
"individuality or freedom").
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 198. Bloustein points out that Warren
and Brandeis distinguished the right to privacy from the right to intellectual and
artistic property in that a pecuniary value underlies the property interest.
Consequently, intellectual and artistic property is an illustration of the right to privacy
only to the extent that one has the right to control its publication. Bloustein, supra
note 19, at 969-70.
21 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 220.22 Prosser, supra note 9.
2 Id. at 389 (citation omitted).
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1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about
the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in
the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiffs name or likeness.'
The Restatement (Second) of Torts then encoded these four
torts.2 In particular, this Note discusses the public disclosure
and intrusion upon seclusion torts.26
A. A Legal Conception of Personal and Decisional Privacy
The conception of common law privacy has been the
subject of much debate and uncertainty.27 Notwithstanding a
lack of scholarly consensus, this Note constructs a particular
conception of the common law right to privacy involving
information about and access to abortion seekers. In this Note,
privacy is identified as an independent value and defined in
terms of autonomy. A functionalist argument reveals that
limiting the accessibility of abortion seekers to anti-abortion
protestors protects women's privacy. Furthermore, rendering
unlawful the disclosure and scrutiny of an individual's abortion
under the invasion of privacy tort promotes reproductive
autonomy.
4 Id.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652A. The Restatement also represents the
limitations on the public disclosure tort cause of action which Warren and Brandeis
outlined, for example, that disclosure of a matter of public interest is not tortious.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 214-19.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 652B & 652D. The other two torts are
inapplicable to the situation in which an anti-abortion protestor photographs women
who are seeking abortions and publicizes those images in order to deter women from
obtaining abortions.
Bloustein contends that Dean Prosser erroneously characterizes privacy in
relation to societal interests in "mental tranquility, reputation, and intangible forms of
property" instead of describing privacy as an independent value. Bloustein, supra note
19, at 966. Moreover, Bloustein proffers a definition of common law invasion of privacy
in terms of dignitary interest: 'The injury is to our individuality, to our dignity as
individuals . . . ." Id. at 1003; accord Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Tangible Injuries: A
Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 819 (1985) (arguing "social recognition of an
interest in human dignity" inheres in the conception of the privacy tort).
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The conception of privacy described here relies
primarily on the models developed by Ruth Gavison 28 and Anita
Allen.' Gavison importantly defines privacy as limited
accessibility of others to an individual.3 ° She enumerates three
forms of accessibility as "the extent to which we are known to
others [information-gathering], the extent to which others have
physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the
subject of others' attention."31 Allen similarly employs a
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
29 ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1988) [hereinafter UNEASY ACCESS]. This Note diverges from Gavison and Allen's
threshold evaluations of privacy as neutral. Allen asserts that "privacy is a descriptive,
neutral concept denoting conditions that are neither always desirable and
praiseworthy, nor always undesirable and unpraiseworthy." Id. at 3. Similarly,
Gavison argues that "[iun order to see which aspects of privacy are desirable and thus
merit protection as a value, however, we must- begin our inquiry in a nonpreemptive
way by starting with a concept that does not make desirability.., part of the notion of
privacy." Gavison, supra note 28, at 425. Conversely, this Note asserts that privacy is
desirable and appropriately invoked in the context of abortion. This is indeed a
departure from Gavison's conclusion that "prohibitions of such conduct as abortion"
which are "sometimes said to constitute invasions of privacy will be seen not to involve
losses of privacy per se under this concept." Id. at 436. Gavison disagrees with the
broad invocation of privacy doctrine in diverse claims because of the implication that
privacy is not distinctively defined as inaccessibility of the individual. Id. at 437.
Moreover, she counters the assertion of privacy values, or the "right to be let alone," in
claims of state interference with abortion, which is more properly phrased as a demand
"for state interference in the form of legal protection against other individuals ... ." Id.
at 438. With respect to Gavison's challenge, this Note argues that privacy, understood
as inaccessibility of the individual abortion seeker, promotes, and can be understood in
terms of, reproductive autonomy. Privacy here is both attractive and apposite.
30 Gavison, supra note 28, at 448. Jeffrey Rosen imports an "accessibility"
definition to his analysis of constitutional privacy jurisprudence:
[B]y focusing on an amorphous vision of privacy that is really a
misnomer for the freedom to make intimate decisions about
reproduction, the Supreme Court has neglected a more focused vision of
privacy that has to do with our ability to control the conditions under
which we make different aspects of ourselves accessible to others.
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 15 (2000) (emphasis added).
31 Gavison, supra note 28, at 423; accord Ingber, supra note 27, at 840 ("The
'right to privacy'. . . consists of the right to determine for oneself the extent to which
one will share with others one's thoughts, one's feelings, and the facts of one's personal
life."). For purposes of this Note, Gavison's concepts of physical inaccessibility and
freedom from others' attention will be treated together. See infra Part III. In an old
case, Pasevich v. New England Life Insurance Co., the court recognized the relationship
between privacy and anonymity which it defined in terms of personal liberty:
Liberty includes the right to live as one will, so long as that will does
not interfere with the rights of another or of the public. One may desire
to live a life of seclusion; another may desire to live a life of publicity;
still another may wish to live a life of privacy as to certain matters, and
of publicity as to others.... Each is entitled to a liberty of choice as to
his manner of life, and neither an individual nor the public has a right
to arbitrarily take away from him this liberty. . . . The right to
withdraw from the public gaze at such times as a person may see fit...
is also embraced within the right of personal liberty.
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
"restricted-access definition" of privacy according to which
"privacy denotes a degree of inaccessibility of persons, their
mental states, and information about them to the senses and
surveillance devices of others."2 The restricted-access approach
presents two beneficial, paradigmatic forms of personal
privacy, informational and physical privacy.
Privacy can also be defined in relation to liberty. A
functionalist argument elucidates this relationship. Gavison's
functionalist theory is "structured around the ways in which
privacy functions to promote goals . . . .' For example, she
argues that privacy "functions to promote liberty of action,
removing the unpleasant consequences of certain actions and
thus increasing the liberty to perform them."3 Liberty of action
can be understood as autonomy.35  Autonomy enables
individuals to act and think free of "harsh sanctions" imposed
by the public. Privacy promotes autonomy by "permit[ting]
individuals to do what they would not do without it for fear of
an unpleasant or hostile reaction from others.37 In this way,
the idiom and rules of privacy can modify or enforce social
norms.' Reproductive autonomy is the goal of privacy which is
central to this discussion.
Similarly, Allen emphasizes the relationship between
privacy and autonomy. She distinguishes privacy in restricted-
access, paradigmatic forms of non-disclosure and seclusion
50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905). See infra text accompanying notes 176-84.
UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 29, at 34.
Gavison, supra note 28, at 446 n.79.
Id. at 448; accord Bloustein, supra note 19, at 1002 (recognizing that a
social goal of "individuality or freedom" is embodied in the conception of privacy).
Gavison, supra note 28, at 448.
Id. at 450.
Id. at 451; see also Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the
Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions into Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989,
1033 (1995) (arguing that when our privacy is intact, "we are free to go about our
business even in public with little concern for relinquishing personal information about
ourselves to others"). McClurg elaborates on this by way of a hypothetical situation:
The moment the Watcher began focusing attention on Joe, a
substantial loss of privacy occurred .... Whereas he formerly was free
to 'be himself in public, secure in the knowledge that he was conveying
information about himself only in a metaphysical sense, Joe must now
act in light of the awareness that this information is being conveyed to
another .... He must now confront the choice of either allowing the
Watcher to acquire this information or modifying his conduct.
Id. at 1034 (emphasis added); accord Bloustein, supra note 19, at 1002-03 (explaining
that tortious conduct is "an interference with the right of the individual to do what he
will"). See discussion infra Part II.B.
See Post, supra note 12.
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from decisional privacy. Decisional privacy is conceptually akin
to liberty and "refers to freedom from coercive governmental or,
by extension, other outside interference with decisionmaking.
'
,
Accordingly, decisional privacy is a proxy for autonomy.40
Despite Allen's argument that personal privacy and decisional
privacy are distinct,' she does acknowledge the relationship
between the two interests, particularly with respect to women's
freedom.42
Allen positions the relationship between personal and
decisional privacy in the context of women's lives' and
UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 29, at 34. The conception of privacy adopted
here as constituted by both personal and decisional privacy is a departure from some
historical notions of privacy. The traditional invasion of privacy plaintiff may recover
damages for mental suffering. See Rothstein v. Montefiore Home, 689 N.E.2d 108 (Ohio
1996) (stating that in order to recover, the plaintiff must establish cognizable harm
done to plaintiff which results in shame or humiliation); see also De May v. Roberts, 9
N.W. 146, 149 (Mich. 1881) ("[The wrong thus done entitles the injured party to
recover the damages ... from shame and mortification .... ."). Notwithstanding that
privacy may protect one from social stigma, and fear of social stigma may thwart
individual autonomy, this Note is predominantly concerned with autonomy as a goal of
privacy.
40 See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1995) (finding the so-called "unenumerated" right to privacy in the language of the
Constitution and in judicial opinions of the Supreme Court concerning namely
reproductive rights, and describing privacy rights as a constitutional guarantee of
deliberative autonomy).
41 UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 29, at 98-99 ("Liberty is conceptually distinct
from privacy .... The concept of decisional privacy has closer conceptual affinities to
liberty than to paradigmatic senses of privacy.").
4 Id. at 33. The argument in this Note conflicts with Allen's argument that
decisional privacy to abort secures paradigmatic forms of privacy for women. See infra
text accompanying notes 48-51.
UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 29, at 53 (explaining that women's privacy
may promote social equality). Interestingly, the typical invasion of privacy tort plaintiff
is a woman. See Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (a woman sued for
disclosure of her former life as prostitute); De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881)
(a woman sued under intrusion upon seclusion for intrusion by defendant into her
home where she gave birth to a child); C'Debaca v. Virginia, No. 2754-97-4, 1999 WL
1129851 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (plaintiff alleged that defendant videotaped up her skirt).
Indeed, Dean Prosser invoked gender in his discussion of the privacy tort's inception:
"All this is a most marvelous tree to grow from the wedding of the daughter of Mr.
Samuel D. Warren. One is tempted to surmise that she must have been a very
beautiful girl." Prosser, supra note 9, at 423. Anita Allen argues persuasively that
"[wiomen lose privacy because others perceive that no significant negative sanctions or
significant risks are associated with intrusion. The absence of risk relates closely to
women's being perceived as inferiors." UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 29, at 143; see also
Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2000)
[hereinafter Allen, Cyberspace] (asserting that "women in cyberspace do not enjoy the
same level and types of desirable privacy that men do. Women face special privacy
problems in cyberspace because there, too, they are perceived as inferiors, ancillaries,
and safe targets and held more accountable for their private conduct. In short, the
complex gendered social norms of accessibility and inaccessibility found in the real
world are also found in the cyberworld.").
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specifically their exercise of reproductive choice. Issues of
women's reproductive autonomy concern the two exemplary
forms of personal privacy, non-disclosure or informational
privacy and seclusion or physical inaccessibility. Allen aptly
argues that reproductive autonomy implicates conditions of
informational privacy. She asserts that informational privacy
in the form of "[siecrecy and confidentiality about procurement
of . . . abortion"" safeguards decisional privacy.' Allen's
discussion of the impact that informational privacy regarding
abortion may have on decisional privacy in the contexts of
spousal consent and minors' rights to contraception and birth
control information" is relevant to this analysis of tort law,
notwithstanding its focus on constitutional law. This
relationship highlighted between personal and decisional
privacy suggests that an invasion of privacy tort suit that
redresses disclosure of a woman's abortion asserts
informational privacy as a condition of decisional privacy or
reproductive autonomy.47
The other form of personal privacy that secures women's
reproductive autonomy is seclusion, defined as "the
inaccessibility of the physical person. . . ."48 Allen explains that,
in the context of motherhood, seclusion implies freedom from
children's infringement on mothers' privacy in the home.49
Thus, Allen suggests abortion "can be utilized to assure that
children are not born who would constitute an obstacle to the
attainment of privacy."50 In this way, Allen argues that the
liberty to obtain an abortion (of which decisional privacy is one
aspect) implicates" seclusion, a form of personal privacy.
However, Allen's conclusion that decisional privacy secures
UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 29, at 110.
Id. at 92 (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 765 (1986), as exemplary of the intersection of paradigmatic privacy-
specifically non-disclosure-and reproductive choice). See infra text accompanying
notes 76-84.
UNEASYACCESS, supra note 29, at 110-13.
47 See infra Part II. See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-604 (1977)
(recognizing the potential adverse effect of the New York statute requiring
identification to the Department of Health of patients using certain prescription drugs
on patients' "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions,"
but declining to hold that statute violates plaintiffs' constitutional right to privacy).
UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 29, at 83.
49 Id. at 87 ("Sharing a life with a child has a psychological dimension that
may undermine a woman's effort to create privacy and freedom by delegating childcare
responsibilities.").
50 Id. at 86.
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seclusion is incongruous with this discussion. Where Allen
advances abortion as a means to personal privacy, this Note
proposes personal privacy as a means to abortion.51 Thus,
although Allen's definition of seclusion as "the inaccessibility of
the physical person" is useful, her positioning of seclusion as a
consequence of free reproductive choice is not.
As argued above, one of the functions of privacy is to
promote women's self-determination or autonomy. Accordingly,
privacy may be a condition of empowerment. 52 This Note
advocates for affording women who seek abortions a civil
remedy under the invasion of privacy tort; the remedy
empowers those who invoke it. A woman who sues under the
invasion of privacy tort for wrongful public disclosure of her
abortion, for example, defines what is private by describing her
injury." Similarly, an intrusion upon seclusion plaintiff
51 See infra Part III.
See Rosa Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L.J. 2047 (2001)
(arguing that violations of privacy could be more fully understood by describing them
in terms of power. In this way, the particularly serious injuries to the personal privacy
of disempowered sociopolitical groups, such as women, are revealed). The concept of
power as underlying diverse "privacy" violations aids Ehrenreich in reconciling the
distinct notions of informational (non-disclosure) and corporeal privacy ("notions of
intimacy, the body, sexuality") represented in JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE
(2000). Id. at 2049-50. See cases cited supra note 43 in which plaintiffs are
predominantly women. Privacy violations and the Internet have particular significance
for women with respect to power. See Allen, Cyberspace, supra note 43, at 1184 ("To
talk about women and privacy in cyberspace requires revisiting traditional feminist
concerns about objectification, subordination, violence, and isolation."). Moreover,
violations can be challenged by affirming women's reproductive rights through
invoking the concept of privacy. But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184, 192-93 (1989) (arguing that, in the context of
abortion, privacy disempowers women by reinforcing sexual inequality along the
public-private divide and has been used to justify state inaction with respect to public
funding of abortions).
Catharine MacKinnon proposed a Minneapolis ordinance in 1983 which
would make pornography a violation of women's civil rights and argued that this civil
remedy was empowering for women. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). Specifically, MacKinnon
argued that by adopting this civil rights remedy, "a legislature recognizes that
pornography, as defined and made actionable, undermines sex equality" and thus "[wie
would have ... recognition and institutional support for our equality." Id. at 62, 70.
Similarly, affording abortion seekers a tort remedy would empower women by
recognizing the primacy of their reproductive autonomy.
Ehrenreich, supra note 52, at 2060 (stating that "those who have the power
have the luxury of defining what is and what is not private.... ."). It is not adequate to
expand common law privacy protection only as to physicians who claim privacy
violation by disclosure of their personal information as abortion providers on the
Internet. See Angela Christina Couch, Wanted: Privacy Protection for Doctors Who
Perform Abortions, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 361 (1996); see also Klebanoff v.
McMonagle, 552 A.2d 677 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (enjoining anti-abortion protestors
from picketing around the home of the abortion provider plaintiff as a violation of
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vindicates her right to make a decision regarding an intensely
personal matter such as abortion free from surveillance or
scrutiny.
B. The Link to Constitutional Reproductive Privacy
Within constitutional jurisprudence, an individual's
right to abortion is defined in terms of privacy. The
constitutional right to reproductive privacy is enunciated in
terms of autonomy, or freedom from governmental
interference. In this way, decisional privacy-or
"nongovernmental decisionmaking"-is traditionally the
conception of privacy associated with reproductive choice.
However, the constitutional right to reproductive privacy
implicates forms of privacy-informational, physical,
decisional-that inhere in the common law right to privacy as
enunciated in the invasion of privacy tort. The 1965 case
Griswold v. Connecticut introduced the constitutional right to
reproductive privacy.67 In Griswold, the Court held that a
Connecticut law prohibiting married couples' use of
contraceptives violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In so
holding, the Court located the underlying constitutional right
"within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees" including the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments. 58 This was the first designation
of penumbral constitutional rights around reproductive choice.
Later, Roe v. Wade59 defined the right to abortion as a privacy
right. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun explained,
"only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in
this guarantee of personal privacy.' Thus, the fundamental
residential privacy). One scholar has argued that the right to publicity should extend to
protect non-celebrity abortion providers whose names are published on the Internet by
anti-abortion protestors such as Neal Horsley. Jennifer L. Carpenter, Internet
Publication: The Case for An Expanded Right of Publicity for Non-Celebrities, 6 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 3 (2001).
M See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56 UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 29, at 97.
57 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
58 Id. at 485.
59410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60 Id. at 152 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). However,
Justice Blackmun also acknowledged that "some state regulation in areas protected by
[the right to privacy] is appropriate" and that "[tihe privacy right involved, therefore,
cannot be said to be absolute." Id. at 154. The Court then ruled that before viability-
the end of the first trimester of pregnancy-a woman is free to choose abortion without
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right to choose abortion is defined in terms of reproductive
liberty or autonomy.
Courts have considered aspects of the constitutional
privacy right to abortion that are similar to features of the
common law right to privacy. For example, in Chico Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Scully,"l the California Court of
Appeals considered the Center's request to amend a
preliminary injunction against defendant anti-abortion
protestors on behalf of clinic clients. Earlier in the litigation, a
protestor observed Barbara Doe, a woman whom he knew, at
the health clinic and revealed Barbara's intention to obtain an
abortion to her sister. Barbara's sister called Barbara at the
clinic and pleaded with her to forgo the abortion. The sister
finally went to the clinic to further dissuade Barbara.6
Consequently, the Center sought to amend a preliminary
injunctive order precluding defendant protestors from
demonstrating on Saturdays during the hours when abortions
were performed.6' The trial court, however, did not grant this
request and plaintiff appealed from the order.64 Specifically, the
Center sought to enjoin the demonstrators from entering any
area around the clinic, including public streets and sidewalks,
from which they could observe and identify abortion seekers
visiting the clinic on Saturdays.6 The plaintiff argued that
protestors' recognition of clients invaded the clients' privacy'
and chilled the privacy rights of women who were dissuaded
from obtaining abortions due to the threat of identification."
The appellate court rejected the Center's request,
finding that neither federal nor state constitutional privacy
rights prevailed because the clinic clients had no reasonable
expectation of anonymity or privacy in public areas
State interference. Id. at 163. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992), Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, rejected
"the trimester framework as a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at
the protection of fetal life."
61 256 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
' Id. at 197.
63 Id. at 198. Abortions were only performed at the clinic on Saturdays.
64 Id.
' Id. at 196.
Chico, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (plaintiff argued that the protestors' conduct
violated clinic clients' right to constitutional privacy, and the court noted that the
California Constitution even more broadly protected individuals' right to privacy
against private persons).
' Id. at 196.
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surrounding the Center. Notwithstanding its ruling against
the Center, the court's discussion of the federal constitutional
privacy interest in abortion is significant:
The federal constitutional right of privacy has been construed as
implicating "at least two different kinds of interests. One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions." Thus, ... "[uit is inherent in the right to make
the abortion decision that the right may be exercised without public
scrutiny ... 'o
The analysis in Chico demonstrates that within constitutional
privacy doctrine personal privacy interests in non-disclosure
and freedom from public scrutiny are associated with decisional
privacy.7°
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Dan forth71  and Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 2 the Supreme Court implicated
the principle of personal privacy in its discussions of
constitutional decisional privacy. In particular, the discussions
of statutory reporting requirements in those cases address a
form of public disclosure of abortion under constitutional law.
In Danforth, the claimants challenged the constitutionality of a
Missouri law which required physicians and health facilities to
keep records of abortion seekers' "relevant maternal health and
life data."73 Local, state and national public health officers were
permitted to examine the records despite their confidentiality.
Claimants argued that these provisions, applicable to records
made throughout a pregnancy, posed an unconstitutional
Id. at 199-200. The court described a clinic client's privacy interest as an
interest in anonymity. See discussion supra note 31 and infra note 176.
Chico, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766 (1986)).
70 See supra Part I.A.
71 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976).
72 476 U.S. 747, 765 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992). In
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992),
the Court overruled Thornburgh with respect to the determination that the informed
consent requirements in that case violated the Constitution. It held that there is no
constitutional violation where "the government requires . . . the giving of truthful,
nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health
risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus" to the
pregnant woman. Id.
73 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79.
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"burden of regulation."74 However, the Court held that the
requirements were constitutional because they were
"reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and
properly respect[ed] a patient's confidentiality and privacy." 5
In Thornburgh, claimants challenged abortion reporting
requirements mandated by a Pennsylvania law.76 The law
required physicians to report information regarding the
woman's personal history, her method of payment for the
abortion and the physician's bases for any medical
conclusions. 77 Unlike the law at issue in Danforth, where
permission to inspect the records was limited to health officials,
the Pennsylvania law directed that the abortion records "be
open to public inspection and copying."7s Although a provision
of the statute specified that the abortion records were not
public records, 79 the Court suggested that these abortion
records would be tantamount to public records because of their
availability for public inspection. Foreshadowing its ruling on
the issue, the Court stated, "[tihe decision to terminate a
pregnancy is an intensely private one that must be protected in
a way that assures anonymity."8 Therefore, the abortion choice
must "'be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of
the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties."81
The Court held that because the reporting provisions were not
reasonably directed to any state interest in health or statistics,
they violated women's constitutional right to privacy around
abortion. 2 Moreover, the Court cautioned that a statute
requiring disclosure of information likely to identify a woman
who seeks an abortion might deter that woman from obtaining
and her physician from performing an abortion.' The
Thornburgh ruling demonstrates that, like common law
privacy, privacy in abortion rights cases may be framed in
74 Id. at 79-80.
75 Id. at 80.
76 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765.
7 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 766.
81 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the veto power of parents
and judges over minors' exercise of the right to abortion)).
8 Id. at 766.
83 Id. at 766-67.
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terms of non-disclosure, a form of personal privacy which may
impact decisional privacy.8
Although constitutional privacy jurisprudence is distinct
from common law privacy doctrine, there is a conceptual link
between the two with respect to privacy protection of
reproductive rights. 86 To the extent that it addresses
paradigmatic forms of privacy, constitutional law may help
determine what is private under the common law and thus
what injuries result from an invasion of privacy.8 v Indeed, one
84 UNEASYACCESS, supra note 29, at 91, 111.
85 See McNally v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1976)
("Thus far only the most intimate phases of personal life have been held to be
constitutionally protected .... Applying this limited doctrine of constitutional privacy,
the federal courts have generally rejected efforts by plaintiffs to constitutionalize
tortious invasions of privacy involving less than the most intimate aspects of human
affairs.") (emphasis added) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965))). But see York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th
Cir. 1963) (holding that the violation of plaintiffs right to privacy, pleaded as a civil
rights violation, amounted to a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights when, after
plaintiff survived a sexual assault, the police photographed plaintiff in the nude and
later circulated the photos to other officers).
In an analogous context, the Supreme Court analyzed the two legal
doctrines in relation to one another. In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990), the state of Missouri adopted the evidentiary standard "clear and
convincing evidence" with regard to the proceeding governing life-sustaining medical
treatment for Nancy Cruzan. The Court held that this evidentiary standard was
consistent with the United States Constitution's Due Process requirements. Justice
Rehnquist discussed, in dicta, the relationship between the common law doctrine of
informed consent and the constitutional right to privacy. Although the Court inquired
into a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, it began its discussion with the
common law "notion of bodily integrity [which] has been embodied in the requirement
that informed consent is generally required for medical treatment" and cited several
cases predicated on both the common law and constitutional privacy rights. Id. at 269,
271. The Court concluded that "the common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed
as generally encompassing the [constitutional] right of a competent individual to refuse
medical treatment." Id. at 277.
87 Interestingly, Stacy R. Horth-Neubert "advocates the incorporation of the
Supreme Court's privacy law constitutional standards into this area as guiding
principles for deciding whether to allow witnesses to prevent the broadcast of their own
testimony in trials that are otherwise open to broadcast." In the Hot Box and On the
Tube: Witness' Interests in Televised Trials, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 169 (1997).
Specifically, Horth-Neubert offers the example, based on the facts of Doe v. Mills, 536
N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), of a woman whose abortion has been disclosed
publicly and is then subpoenaed to testify to the disclosure at trial. See infra text
accompanying notes 100-16. Horth-Neubert argues that constitutional privacy
jurisprudence around abortion could guide a state court in determining whether
broadcasting the witness's testimony would be an invasion of her privacy under the
Restatement. Horth-Neubert, supra, at 201-02. But see Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem
for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 291, 298 (1983) ("Although the constitutional privacy cases [including abortion]
may address expectations of seclusion and protect very intimate and personal areas of
life, just as the Warren-Brandeis tort does, the existence and the contours of the
constitutional right to privacy reveal little about whether and when a corollary interest
should be protected against invasion in ordinary tort law.").
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scholar made a similar argument with respect to the Fourth
Amendment and the common law tort action against an
individual who intrudes upon another's privacy.' Specifically,
the argument has been made in the context of governmental
intrusions upon individual privacy. Both governmental
intrusion and private actor interference constitute a "similar
wrong," namely "a threat to individual liberty, although the
invasions differ in seriousness and type of remedies available. 9°
Further support for this argument comes from a recent case,
Wilson v. Layne,91 in which the Court held that "ride alongs,"
where media personnel (private persons) accompany police
during execution of arrest warrants, violate homeowners'
Fourth Amendment right to residential privacy.9 It follows
that a private actor's invasion of an abortion seeker's privacy,
like governmental infringement on a woman's right to privacy,
threatens to thwart her reproductive autonomy.9
In sum, the constitutional "right to be let alone" in the
context of abortion, like common law privacy, may invoke
personal privacy principles in terms of autonomy. These bodies
of law similarly perceive information disclosure and intrusion
upon physical seclusion as potentially injurious to individual
privacy and invoke the concept of privacy to defend the
intimacy of personal affairs. Applying the invasion of privacy
tort to abortion positions privacy in relation to its critical goal
of promoting reproductive autonomy.
88 Bloustein, supra note 19, at 975.
89 Id. at 975, 994 (comparing De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881)
(regarding the alleged invasion of plaintiffs privacy where defendant entered her home
without plaintiffs consent and viewed the birth of her child), with Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (concerning the alleged violation of petitioners' privacy
where police officers used electronic listening devices to overhear conversations in
petitioners' home), and suggesting that even though the intrusions were respectively
committed by a private person and a government entity, "the underlying wrong in both
instances was the same; the act complained of was an affront to the individual's
independence and freedom").
90 With respect to differing remedies, Bloustein explains that the plaintiff in
De May pursued a tort remedy against an individual for alleged invasion of privacy,
whereas in Silverman, 365 U.S. 505, a government agent committed the alleged
invasion of privacy and plaintiff sought the suppression of evidence obtained from the
alleged intrusion. Id. at 994.
91 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
9 Id. at 614.
See discussion supra Part I.A. Note that Wilson v. Layne is not invoked
here in order to advocate that courts find anti-abortion protest conduct violates
women's constitutional right to privacy around abortion without some further
connection between the protestor and state action, as in Layne where media personnel
accompanied the police on the search of Wilson's home.
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II. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
The two branches of the invasion of privacy tort that
would afford abortion seekers protection against anti-abortion
protestors' conduct are public disclosure of private facts and
intrusion upon seclusion. Public disclosure of private facts9 is
defined as follows: "One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is
of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.""
Warren and Brandeis recognized the significance of "injurious
disclosures as to private matters"9 in The Right to Privacy:
The right of one who has remained a private individual, to prevent
his public portraiture, presents the simplest case for such extension
[of tort redress for mental suffering]; the right to protect one's self
from pen portraiture, from a discussion by the press of one's private
affairs, would be a more important and far-reaching one.w
The authors advocated for the right to an "inviolate
personality" against the perceived encroachment of the
proliferating press9 and its "pen portraiture." Indeed, Dean
Prosser in Privacy opined that Warren and Brandeis were
"primarily concerned" with this particular branch of the
invasion of privacy tort.9
There has been a single successful public disclosure tort
lawsuit in the abortion context. °w In Doe v. Mills,"° defendant
protestors and a religious order discovered that plaintiffs Doe
and Roe planned to obtain abortions at the Women's Advisory
Center in Livonia, Michigan.'02 The defendants received this
information from a nonparty who found a document in a
nearby dumpster indicating that the two women had scheduled
9 Although the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) titles the
tort "publicity given to private life," Prosser refers to it as "public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts." Prosser, supra note 9, at 392. For purposes of this Note,
the tort will be referred to as "public disclosure."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 204.
Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
% Id. at 205.
Prosser, supra note 9, at 392.
1oo See discussion infra pp. 332-33 regarding a pending lawsuit under the tort
in the abortion context.
101 536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
102 Id. at 827.
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abortions at the clinic. Defendants appeared at the clinic and
displayed large signs which revealed plaintiffs' names and the
fact that they planned to obtain abortions the next day. °4 The
signs begging Doe and Roe not to "kill their babies"'05 were
displayed to the public at the entrance to the clinic parking
lot. 13 Defendants' stated aim was to dissuade Doe and Roe from
going through with the abortions.' 7 Plaintiffs sued for invasion
of privacy under the public disclosure tort, l5 and were required
to show: "(1) the disclosure of information, (2) that is highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) that is of no legitimate
concern to the public."' The trial court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed.1 ° The
court reasoned that the revelation of plaintiffs' identities and
their planned abortions-facts that plaintiffs intended to keep
"private, confidential, and free from any publicity"-was
sufficiently objectively offensive to constitute a jury question."'
In Mills, the court undertook a two-part analysis of
whether the disclosed fact was of legitimate public concern." 2
The court first considered whether the fact disclosed was
private. Analogizing abortion to sexual relations and medical
treatment, both of which are regarded as private matters under
103 Id.
104 Id.
106 Id.
106 Mills, 536 N.W.2d at 828. Notably, the court rejected defendants' argument
that, because the property around the clinic was public, displaying the signs there did
not violate plaintiffs' right to privacy. Id. at 832. The court reasoned that plaintiffs
were protected because the signs displayed information about abortion, a procedure
which takes place in the private space of the clinic. Id. Furthermore, the mere fact that
plaintiffs are visible to the public when entering and exiting the clinic does not defeat
the action. Id. See discussion infra Part III.B regarding public privacy and the
intrusion upon seclusion tort.
107 Mills, 536 N.W.2d at 828-29.
10n Plaintiffs additionally claimed under the intrusion upon seclusion tort.
However, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of this claim based on
plaintiffs' failure to allege that defendants obtained the information in an intrusive
manner. Instead, under the intrusion upon seclusion claim, plaintiffs erroneously
alleged that defendants tortiously publicized the fact of their abortions. Id. at 832. See
infra Part III.A.
10 Mills, 536 N.W.2d at 828 (citing Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994)).
"0 Id. at 827.
il Id. at 829.
1 Id. at 829-30. Although the Mills court merged the analysis of whether the
abortions were private with whether they were of legitimate public concern, many
other courts analyze these as two discrete elements. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W
Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
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tort law, 13 the court concluded that a reasonable person would
consider abortion a private matter.14 The court then evaluated
whether plaintiffs' abortions were of sufficiently legitimate
public concern to override their privacy interest. It stated,
"even though the abortion issue may be regarded as a matter of
public interest, the plaintiffs' identities in this case were not
matters of legitimate public concern, nor a matter of public
record, but, instead, were purely private matters.""' The court
found for the plaintiffs, reversing the decision of the court
below that granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on this claim.16 Mills provides an excellent example of the
common law remedy available to abortion seekers against
protestors like Neal Horsley who seek to dissuade women from
obtaining abortions by giving publicity to that private decision.
A. An Analysis of Elements
The elements of the public disclosure tort action, which
vary in appellation by jurisdiction, illuminate the type of
unlawful conduct targeted and the privacy interest vindicated
by this branch of the privacy tort. In order to make out a prima
facie case of invasion of privacy under the public disclosure
tort, a plaintiff must generally establish: (1) that the publicity
given to; (2) a private fact; (3) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person; and (4) that the fact disclosed was not of
legitimate interest to the public."1 7
The first element of the public disclosure cause of action
is that the defendant give "publicity" to the plaintiffs private
facts."8 Publicity "means that the matter is made public, by
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons
that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to
become one of public knowledge."1 9 Certainly, where an anti-
abortion protestor like Neal Horsley gives publicity to an
individual's abortion on the Internet, a globally pervasive
communication "network," it properly can be considered
dissemination to "the public at large." The determination that a
" Mills, 536 N.W.2d at 829-30. See infra text accompanying notes 126-54.
114 Mills, 536 N.W.2d at 830.
" Id. (emphasis added). See discussion of plaintiffs identity in abortion cases
infra text accompanying notes 176-84.
116 Mills, 536 N.W.2d at 832.
117 See, e.g., Shulman, 955 P.2d at 478.
118 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. a.
119 Id.
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matter was given sufficient publicity is generally a threshold
conclusion.'2°
In order to meet the second element of the public
disclosure tort, the plaintiff must show that the matter
disclosed "concern[s] the private, as distinguished from the
public, life of the individual."12' One category of private facts is
defined in terms of non-disclosure.122 Warren and Brandeis
explained that although "there is no fixed formula" in
determining what constitutes one's private life, "to whatever
degree and in whatever connection a man's life has ceased to be
private, before the publication under consideration has been
made, to that extent the protection is to be withdrawn."l' The
Restatement of Torts echoes this limitation: "matters of public
record," or information that "the plaintiff himself leaves open to
the public eye"12 are not private. Another category of private
facts includes highly intimate matters. For an individual, these
are those "phases of his life and his activities and some facts
about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but
keeps entirely to himself or at most reveals only to his family
Interestingly, in C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D.
Minn. 1999), where plaintiff claimed invasion of privacy based on the disclosure of her
abortion to co-workers, the court ruled against plaintiff because she failed to allege
sufficient publicity given to the fact of her abortion. The court did not reach the
question of whether plaintiffs abortion was private and so declined to "address
defendant's argument for dismissal on the ground that the information disclosed was
not 'private' .... " Id. at 1085-86 n.3; accord Bonacci v. Save Our Unborn Lives, Inc., 11
Pa. D & C.3d 259 (Pa. Com. P1. 1979).
11 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. b. Some scholars argue that
litigating a public disclosure tort is inherently "self-defeating" because recovery
requires that the plaintiff, in effect, re-broadcast in court the "private" facts. Post,
supra note 12, at 985-86. However, this Note emphasizes, as Post himself points out,
that the tort litigation vindicates a right-for example, to autonomous reproductive
choice-and so overrides any concern of re-broadcasting private facts. Id.; accord
Bloustein, supra note 19, at 1003 ("[Tjhe legal remedy represents a social vindication of
the human spirit thus threatened rather than a recompense for the loss suffered."). See
supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
1m Dean Prosser also defines privacy as non-disclosure in discussing intrusion
upon seclusion, for example, where there is no tort action if inspection of information is
required by law and thus obtainment is legal. Prosser, supra note 9, at 391.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 215.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. b. But see discussion of right to
public privacy infra Part III.B. In the famous case Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1931), the court held that, although the facts that plaintiff was formerly a
prostitute and had been charged with murder appeared in the public record of her trial
for that crime, the disclosure of such personal information in connection with plaintiffs
true maiden name by defendant movie producer was actionable under the invasion of
privacy tort. In so holding, the court relied on language from the California
Constitution regarding a person's "inalienable rights" to justify its novel recognition of
a common law right to privacy. Id.
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or to close friends."12 Traditionally, two such matters are
medical information and sexuality. The unlawful disclosure of
medical and sexual facts can be analogized to the disclosure of
a woman's abortion.
Courts have long considered medical information,
including medical treatment, medical history and medical
records, private under the common law right to privacy. In an
early case, Barber v. Time, 26 the court stated, "[clertainly if
there is any right of privacy at all, it should include the right to
obtain medical treatment at home or in a hospital for an
individual personal condition ... without personal publicity."'"
Whether grounded in the tradition of confidentiality cloaking
medical information"2 or general agreement as to its
intimacy, 12 medical treatment is considered private and its
disclosure is actionable under tort law where it results in
embarrassment and harm to the plaintiff.'3 Moreover, medical
history is protected under the common law right to privacy.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated, "[a] right
to conceal one's medical history is readily derivable from the
branch of the tort of invasion of privacy that protects people
against the indiscriminate publicizing of intimate details of
their personal lives." 3' Finally, courts have held that disclosure
of medical records is actionable under the public disclosure
tort. For example, the Mississippi Court of Appeals held that
where the plaintiff had not publicized his own medical records,
defendant committed the tort of public disclosure of private
facts by making the content of the records known to others. 32
Medical privacy can be extended by analogy to abortion
in two ways. First, medical privacy can be applied to abortion
itself as a medical procedure. The intersection of abortion with
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. b.
12 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
127 Id. at 295.
M Id. (noting that "the ethics of the medical profession require such matters
to be kept confidential").
1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. b (identifying "unpleasant or
disgraceful or humiliating illnesses" as "intimate details" of one's life).
130 Mills, 536 N.W.2d at 829; accord Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc.,
717 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (defendant television station's disclosure of
plaintiffs treatment for plastic surgery, her embarrassing scars, and its broadcast of
her identity therewith violated plaintiffs right to privacy).
131 Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995).
13 McCorkle v. McCorkle, 811 So. 2d 258, 269 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). There,
the court described the medical records as private in nature because of their cloak of
confidentiality. Id. at 267.
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medical privacy is apparent in an Illinois lawsuit pending at
the writing of this Note."" Plaintiff Jane Doe suffered a tear in
her uterus as a result of an abortion procedure. As Doe was
being loaded into a van for transport from the Hope Clinic
where the abortion was performed to St. Elizabeth Hospital for
further treatment, anti-abortion protestors Angela and Daniel
Michael photographed her. The protestors later obtained the
plaintiffs hospital records and published the records, along
with the photograph and identifying information, on an anti-
abortion website. Jane Doe and the Hope Clinic sued St.
Elizabeth Medical Center, Angela Michael, Daniel Michael and
other anti-abortion protestors, Stephen Wetzel, Verna Cepicky,
Jerry Lieneke, Tim Berands and Reverend John Gamblin. In
their complaint filed July 2, 2001, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts.
Specifically, the complaint alleged that "Defendants'
procurement of the Plaintiffs said photograph and medical
records constituted an intrusion into Plaintiffs private matters
in that the Plaintiffs abortion procedure, . . .her medical
history, details concerning her personal life.., were all private
facts of no legitimate concern." 1' With respect to the public
disclosure cause of action, plaintiffs alleged that "[tihe
unauthorized publication of the said photograph, the said
medical records and the said private information was highly
offensive and/or objectionable to both the Plaintiff and to any
reasonable person. . . ."' On August 22, 2001, presiding Judge
George Moran issued a preliminary injunction against
defendants ordering them to "restrain[] from obtaining,
distributing or publishing the medical records, medical data
and photograph of Plaintiff Jane Doe."1" Judge Moran's order
characterizes the defendants' actions as invasive of Doe's
medical privacy, rather than focusing exclusively on the
intrusion into or disclosure of her abortion. There has been
much media attention given to this case.137
3 The Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., No. 2001-L-
1090 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed July 2, 2001).
134 Complaint at 2-3, Hope Clinic (No. 2001-L-1090).
1 Id. at 5.
136 Preliminary Injunction at 4, Hope Clinic (No. 2001-L-1090).
137 See, e.g., Steve Korris, Judge Throws Cold Water on Abortion Protests, CI.
TRIB., Feb. 6, 2002; Judge Keeps Woman's Records Off Net, AP ONLINE, Aug. 23, 2001;
Stephanie Simon, Privacy At Stake in New Antiabortion Strategy Debate, L.A. TIMES,
July 6, 2001, at A18.
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Second, the analogy between medical privacy and
privacy around abortion is appropriate because of the extreme
intimacy of both medical information and abortion. To be sure,
abortion has been described as a "matter[] of a sensitive and
highly personal nature" in support of the non-disclosure of a
plaintiffs identity in a suit challenging the constitutionality of
a state abortion law.1
Sexuality and sexual conduct are also considered
private under tort law. According to the Restatement, "[s]exual
relations, for example, are normally entirely private matters..
. ."'3 Abortion and sexuality are marked by correlative high
degrees of intimacy. At least one court has stated, "no aspects
of life is [sic] more personal and private than those having to do
with one's sexual organs and reproductive system." '4°
Furthermore, several courts have held that the disclosure of
another's sexual conduct is actionable under the public
disclosure of private facts tort. 141 That sexual matters are
considered private bears on a similar description of abortion
under the common law, illustrated by a class of invasion of
privacy tort cases regarding "outing" or the public disclosure of
an individual's homosexuality. The analysis of public disclosure
claims in outing cases is traditional. Several courts held that
where one's homosexuality is already a matter of public
knowledge or record, further disclosure of that fact is not
actionable. 4 2 Indeed, under these circumstances, there would
138 Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974).
13 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. b. Warren and Brandeis
condemned journalists who, "[t]o satisfy a prurient taste," publish information about
individuals' sexual relations. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 196.
140 Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990) (finding that
defendants violated plaintiffs privacy by disclosing the private fact of her
hysterectomy, but that the communication was protected by defendants' qualified
privilege to warn other employees of health risks at the nuclear power plant). A less
persuasive argument can be made that the Restatement's definition of sexual relations
as private directly implicates reproductivity as a private fact because pregnancy itself
(and childbirth) may result from sexual intercourse. See generally De May v. Roberts, 9
N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
141 See Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 884 (S.D. Ga. 1983)
(finding that plaintiffs sexual relationship with defendant was a private fact); Diaz v.
Oakland Tribune, Inc. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that
transsexual plaintiffs sexual identity was a private matter under the public disclosure
tort).
' See, e.g., Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 124, 127
(Tex. App. 2001) (holding that where plaintiffs homosexuality was disclosed when he
was a participant in a family law court proceeding and thus "public as a matter of law,"
re-disclosure by defendant television station was not actionable under tort law); Hogan
v. Hearst Corp., 945 S.W.2d 246, 251 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding that defendant
publisher's article regarding decedent's homosexual conduct as indicated in public
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be no "private" fact to disclose. Without that bar on the action,
at least one court found sexual orientation to be a private fact.
In Simpson v. Burrows,"' plaintiff was a restaurant owner in a
rural town whose identity as a lesbian became the subject of
letters sent to numerous individuals and local groups. Finding
for the plaintiff with respect to her invasion of privacy tort
claim, the court stated simply, "[p]laintiffs sexual orientation
is a private fact."1" Another court determined that a plaintiffs
homosexuality was private according to the Restatement's
identification of "sexual conduct" as a private matter.1M
5
Cases that consider outing under the public disclosure
tort are particularly useful in the context of abortion because
they draw on the connection between personal and decisional
privacy. These cases show that disclosing another's
homosexuality may result in the plaintiff being fired,1" being
forced to abandon a business' 4' and even committing suicide.
1 M8
These extreme consequences suggest that one might be
compelled to act in such a way as to avoid the likelihood of
another disclosing his or her sexual orientation. Thus, with
sexual orientation, as with abortion, personal "privacy permits
individuals to do what they would not do without it for fear of
an unpleasant or hostile reaction from others."49 Although
disclosure may carry with it social stigma, the more egregious
cost of disclosure is that it may impede one's liberty of action or
restrict one's choices.1" These "outing" cases show that
disclosure may impact one's choice to be openly gay and are
record of arrest for indecent exposure was not an actionable disclosure under tort law);
Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that disclosure of plaintiffs homosexuality already publicized as a result of his political
celebrity was not actionable under tort law).
1 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000).
'1 Id. at 1125.
14 Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, P.C., 923 P.2d 166, 172 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995),
aft'd in part, rev'd in part, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997). It seems that the court of appeals
in Borquez found for plaintiff in part because his HIV-positive status was made public
in addition to his sexual orientation. The court determined that plaintiffs ailment was
private by relying on the Restatement characterization of stigmatized illnesses as
private. Id. at 172-73.
14 Id. A related case is M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001), in which defendant published a photograph depicting plaintiffs as
members of a sports team with their coach who had pleaded guilty to child molestation.
Plaintiffs alleged that homophobia compelled them to quit school or transfer. Id. at
511.
147 Simpson, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108.
'4 Hogan v. Hearst Corp., 945 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. 1997).
149 Gavison, supra note 28, at 451.
150 See supra note 39.
2002]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
analogous to potential public disclosure lawsuits in the
abortion context which would assert that disclosure threatens
to deter a woman from seeking an abortion."" Like abortion
seekers, individuals who bring suit regarding the unlawful
disclosure of their homosexuality vindicate their right to make
autonomous choices.
Extending the analogies of medical and sexual privacy
suggests that abortion should be considered a private fact
under the public disclosure of private facts tort. First, like
medical information and sexual choices, an abortion is a highly
personal experience. Abortion is intimate because it relates to
pregnancy and reproductive choice.152 Second, with increasingly
intense anti-abortion protest around clinics and the use of
surreptitious surveillance technology, abortion seekers are
unable to take evasive action against protestors. The generic
suggestion that an individual who knows that she is under
intrusive surveillance can protect her privacy "by applying
social sanctions" such as confronting the intruder or fleeing is
impracticable in this context.1" A woman may not know that
she is being surveilled, and if she does, she may flee the clinic
and forgo the abortion. In effect, then, she has relinquished
control of her reproductive choice to the protestors. Third, as a
matter of public policy, the public disclosure tort may be
invoked to protect certain classes of people-for example,
women exercising reproductive choice and gays and lesbians-
who suffer disclosure of especially personal facts that are
politically charged.1 5
In addition to meeting the requirements of publicity and
privacy of the fact disclosed, the public disclosure plaintiff must
satisfy a third element: that the publicity given to her private
facts is "highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable" person
151 See discussion supra Part I.A.
1"2 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
'm See Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, Privacy and The Reasonable Paranoid: The
Protection of Privacy in Public Places, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 305, 330 (2000) (arguing for
a limited right to public privacy and suggesting that one writing in a diary in a public
park who notices someone looking at the diary "can then confront the intruder or
simply close the diary and walk away"). Paton-Simpson also acknowledges that the
development of covert surveillance technology makes physical evasion a less tenable
solution to intrusive scrutiny. Id.
164 See John A. Jurata, Jr., The Tort That Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle
Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 513-15
(1999). See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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who would be "justified in feeling seriously aggrieved .... 
Social stigma resulting from disclosure may be an indicia of
offensiveness and is an added reason to protect certain private
facts.' 56 As with medical privacy, privacy around sexual
relations may protect the individual from social stigma. With
respect to the revelation of the plaintiffs homosexuality in
Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, P.C., the court stated, "the
disclosure of this information would be highly objectionable to a
reasonable person because a strong stigma still attaches to...
homosexuality .... , Similarly, the plaintiff in Greenwood v.
Taft" alleged that the publicity given to his homosexuality
violated his common law right to privacy. Although the court
remanded the case for insufficiency of facts alleged, it
suggested that "[i]f Greenwood had chosen to keep his sexual
orientation private, and the firm's alleged disclosure 'outed'
him, a reasonable person may well have been offended by this
disclosure."59 Thus, disclosure is objectionable where it would
shame or disgrace the average individual.
B. First Amendment Implications of Disclosure Suits
If a court determines that the matter disclosed is of
legitimate public concern, an action for invasion of privacy is
defeated. Whether the public has a legitimate interest in the
disclosed matter is defined as a question of "newsworthiness"
and thus implicates the First Amendment privilege of the
156 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. c. Another description of the
offensiveness of the disclosure is as "deeply shocking to the average person subjected to
such exposure." Haynes v. Alfred Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1235 (7th Cir. 1993). The
lower court in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. 34 F. Supp. 19, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1938),
adopted what is known as the "mores test": "that under our law one may speak and
publish what he desires provided no offense against public morals... is committed...
." Robert C. Post argues that the inquiry into the offensiveness of the disclosure
is virtually identical to that which underlies the "private facts"
requirement. Both focus broadly on the appropriateness of the
communicative act in question, rather than narrowly on the specific
content of that communication. The distinct contribution of the
"offensiveness" requirement is primarily that it makes explicit the
notion that the law will not regulate every inappropriate revelation, but
only those which are "highly offensive."
Post, supra note 12, at 983-84; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 216.
6 See Bloustein, supra note 19, at 978-79 (arguing that, although shame may
result from public disclosure of one's private facts, the real injury is "that some aspect
of [one's] life has been held up to public scrutiny at all").
157 Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, P.C., 923 P.2d 166, 173 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995)
affd in part, rev'd in part, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997).
663 N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
Ms Id. at 1035.
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press.'so Information in these cases is typically disclosed to the
public via the press or an arm of it. Concern about media
activity encroaching on privacy rights is not new. Indeed,
Warren and Brandeis addressed the conflict between the two
interests in The Right to Privacy.161 In identifying the "exact
line at which the dignity and convenience of the individual
must yield to the demands of the public welfare or of private
justice," the authors created the "public interest" limitation on
the tort action.'62 Courts have framed the question of
newsworthiness for the jury by enumerating three factors: "[1]
the social value of the published facts, [2] the extent of the
intrusion into ostensibly private matters, and [31 the extent to
which the party voluntarily assumed a position of public
notoriety."' 6 Even if the first three elements of the tort-
publicity given to a private fact, the disclosure of which is
objectively offensive-are satisfied, the tort action may be
defeated if the disclosed fact is deemed to be of legitimate
concern to the public.' 4
Notwithstanding that a matter is intimate, it may be of
legitimate public interest if it is contained in the public record
or is connected with the identity of a public figure. Because
access to information in the public record is unrestricted and
thus the data is not private,' it is clear that whether the
public interest in the disclosed subject matter is legitimate
relates to, but is not coextensive with, the determination that a
subject is private.'s The Supreme Court has outlined the First
160 The Restatement identifies this concern: "It seems clear that the common
law restrictions on recovery for publicity given to a matter of proper public interest will
now become a part of the constitutional law of freedom of the press and freedom of
speech." RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. d. Scholars have been prolific in the
area of anti-abortion protest and the First Amendment. See infra note 182.
161 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 214.
162 Id. Of this conflict, one scholar suggested "the value of privacy may
constitute a counterforce of perhaps equal symbolic and societal influence to the value
embodied in the first amendment." Ingber, supra note 27, at 843.
163 Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Ct., 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (explaining that the question is one for the jury whether plaintiffs name, which
defendant published because plaintiff discovered a rape/murder victim's body, was of
legitimate public concern).
164 See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
165 See supra text accompanying note 124.
16 Additionally, the public interest analysis relates to whether the disclosure
would be objectively highly offensive. The Restatement explains,
[w]hen the matter to which publicity is given is true, it is not enough
that the publicity would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The
common law has long recognized that the public has a proper interest
[Vol. 68: 1
TORT REMEDY FOR ABORTION SEEKERS
Amendment implications of publicizing information obtained
from public records. However, the Court has not yet described
potential freedom of speech implications for the invasion of
privacy tort with respect to publicizing a "private" fact. In Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn," the plaintiff sued for invasion of
privacy under the public disclosure tort where the defendant
published the name of his daughter, a victim of rape and
murder. Defendant obtained the name of the victim from court
records. 69 The Court considered whether the Georgia statute
which prohibited publicizing the name of a rape victim was
consistent with the First Amendment privilege of the press. It
held that where a judicial record is open to public inspection,
the publication of truthful, lawfully obtained information
therein is privileged under the First Amendment,
notwithstanding that publication would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. 169 The Court did not analyze whether the
common law privacy protection of the victim's identity in
connection with an intimate matter such as rape might
diminish the significance of First Amendment principles. 7 ° The
fact that the information was part of the public record
truncated the Court's analysis of common law privacy.
Similarly, in Florida Star v. B.J.F. ,17' a rape victim sued
defendant newspaper for violating her right to privacy where
defendant published her name, obtained from a police report.
The Court focused its inquiry on whether the Florida statute
making it unlawful to publish the name of a victim of a sexual
in learning about many matters. When the subject-matter of the
publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is no invasion of privacy.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. d.
167 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
168 Id. at 472.
169 Id. at 491.
170 Specifically, the Court stated:
Rather than address the broader question whether truthful
publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability
consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it
another way, whether the State may ever define and protect an area of
privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press, it is appropriate to
focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy that this
case presents, namely, whether the State may impose sanctions on the
accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public
records-more specifically, from judicial records which are maintained
in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open
to public inspection.
Id.
171 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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offense was constitutional under the First Amendment 172 and
limited its analysis to "principles that sweep no more broadly
than the appropriate context of the instant case.1 73 The Court
held that "where a newspaper publishes truthful information
which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state
interest of the highest order, and that no such interest is
satisfactorily served by imposing liability" under the Florida
statute.74 Recognizing the press' broad privilege to publish
information which is part of the public record, the Court
declined to describe the First Amendment implications of
publicity given to private facts under the privacy tort.175
Where there is no threshold determination that the
disclosed information is newsworthy, as with public records,
courts have distinguished between disclosure of a plaintiffs
identity and revelation of the subject matter to which the
plaintiffs identity relates. 76 In one set of cases, where the
plaintiff has assumed a public position, the plaintiffs identity
may be considered newsworthy. Indeed, Prosser underscored
this rationale in Privacy when he stated that, in addition to the
press' privilege to give publicity to newsworthy topics of
legitimate interest to the public, the press has license to
publicize the identity of one who has voluntarily become a
public figure. 77 Generally, giving publicity to the private facts
of one who has assumed a public position is consistent with the
right of privacy because the public figure's expectation of and
accordant right to privacy are voluntarily diminished.
1 8
172 Id. at 530-41.
173 Id. at 533.
174 Id. at 541.
175 Some scholars assert that the Court's ruling in Florida Star permanently
rendered the tort an ineffective remedy for invasion of privacy. See Jacqueline R. Rolfs,
The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of the End for the Tort of Public Disclosure,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1107. But see Haynes v. Alfred Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th
Cir. 1993) (Judge Posner suggested that the Court was careful not to "declare the tort
of publicizing intensely personal facts totally defunct.").
176 The relationship of plaintiffs identity to the disclosure raises the issue of
anonymity as another paradigmatic form of privacy in the abortion context. See Paton-
Simpson, supra note 153, at 325-26; see also Gavison, supra note 28, at 428, 436. In
this Note, anonymity is described as a condition of privacy that facilitates the exercise
of autonomy in the abortion context. See discussion supra Part I.A.
17 Prosser, supra note 9, at 410.
178 Id. at 410-11. With respect to voluntary public figures, the Restatement
explains:
So far as his public appearances and activities themselves are
concerned, such an individual has . . . no right of privacy .... [T]he
legitimate interest of the public in the individual may extend beyond
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Moreover, where one's identity has involuntarily come to public
attention, for example, through heroism or criminal activity,
there may be no invasion of privacy due to the newsworthiness
of the event.179
In another substantial body of case law, a plaintiffs
identity is deemed non-newsworthy. Here, press activity runs
afoul of the right to privacy where it exposes the identity of an
individual who intends to remain private with respect to a
particularly intimate matter.'s° These matters may concern
medical treatment or, significantly, reproductive issues such as
fertility or abortion.81 The distinction between newsworthy
facts and privacy of an individual's identity is important in the
context of abortion. The permissible journalistic goal of
protesting abortion can be attained without identifying a
particular abortion seeker. As the abortion debate accrues
those matters which are themselves made public, and to some
reasonable extent may include information as to matters that would
otherwise be private.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. e. According to the excerpt from the
Restatement above, it could be argued that the identity of a celebrity or other public
figure who has had an abortion is newsworthy. However, this Note argues that even a
public figure has a right to common law privacy which protects her abortion from
disclosure by another given the extreme intimacy of abortion. Additionally, the risk of
deterrence posed-by disclosure supports an argument for extending the right to privacy
to public figures. The Court's discussion in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765 (1986), of the limitations on
permissible disclosure of the identity of a woman seeking an abortion is applicable
here. See supra text accompanying notes 76-84.
179 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652D cmt. f.
180 See Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that plaintiff who underwent plastic surgery and suffered
embarrassing scarring as a result was unlawfully identified by defendant television
station); Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 880 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (remanding
the case for jury consideration of whether plaintiffs abortions are private and non-
newsworthy to make out tort of public disclosure of private facts); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp.,
795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs' identities in connection
with their participation in hospital in vitro fertilization program is not a matter of
legitimate public interest). But see Haynes v. Alfred Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1233 (7th
Cir. 1993) (stating that publishing the identities of plaintiffs in book about black
migration was necessary in order for "the public.., to evaluate the profound social and
political questions that the book raises" and to lend concreteness to the problems
described in the book); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489 (Cal. 1998)
(holding that identifying characteristics of accident victim could not have been edited
from broadcast and were dramatic and newsworthy); Howard v. Des Moines Register,
283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979) (holding that the identity of plaintiff who was
involuntarily sterilized while a resident of an institution was newsworthy). Howard is
distinguishable from the case in which a protestor, like Neal Horsley, discloses the fact
of a particular woman's abortion. First, the court there found that the sterilization was
part of the public record, and second, the identity of the plaintiff in Howard was useful
in exposing "maladministration and patient abuses" at the institution. Id. at 300, 303.
181 See Winstead, 517 N.W.2d 874; YG., 795 S.W.2d 488.
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political attention and increasingly concerns the legal
community8 2 and the public, the violation of women's privacy
becomes more serious and the need to protect privacy
intensifies. Moreover, with the availability of new surveillance
equipment18 and expansive channels of communication such as
the Internet, the "degradation of personality by the public
disclosure of private intimacies [will] become a legally
significant reality"l8" in the context of abortion.
'8 The legal community has given much attention to First Amendment issues
surrounding the actions of anti-abortion protestors. In Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/ Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130
(D. Or. 1999), abortion providers and abortion rights groups filed suit against anti-
abortion protestors seeking to enjoin protestors from posting the names of providers on
the Internet. The United States District Court of Oregon rejected the First Amendment
defense of the anti-abortion protestors and held that the protestors engaged in illegal
communication or "true threats" and were enjoined from further protest activity. Id. at
1154-55. The plaintiffs in that action were awarded a judgment of $107 million. Roger
Parloff, Defending the Doctors, AM. LAW. July, 1999, at 91. Then, in Planned
Parenthood of the Columbia/ Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists,
244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the
award to plaintiffs, holding that defendant protestors' speech was protected under the
First Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then entered an order for
rehearing of the case en banc. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v.
Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 268 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2001). Recently, the court of
appeals reheard the case and, affirming the order of the district court, held that the
American Coalition of Life Activists' statements in the form of "wanted"-type posters
and listings of the names of killed or wounded abortion providers on the Nuremberg
Files website amounted to "true threats" to intimidate under the Freedom of Access to
Clinics Entrances Act and therefore were not protected speech under the First
Amendment. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am.
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). The "true threats"
doctrine under the First Amendment and its intersection with abortion and technology
as raised by this case have interested many scholars. See Jason Schlosberg, Judgment
on "Nuremberg": An Analysis of Free Speech and Anti-Abortion Threats Made on the
Internet, 7 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 52 (2001); Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and
The First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEY. L. REV. 541 (2000); Melanie C. Hagan,
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act and the Nuremberg Files Web Site: Is
The Site Properly Prohibited Or Protected Speech?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 411 (2000);
Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First
Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1175 (2000); Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, New
Millennium, Same Old Speech: Technology Changes, But the First Amendment Issues
Don't, 79 B.U. L. REV. 959 (1999); Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, The "True
Threat" To Cyberspace: Shredding The First Amendment For Faceless Fears, 7
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 291 (1999); John Rothchild, Menacing Speech and the First
Amendment: A Functional Approach to Incitement That Threatens, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 207 (1999).
M Anti-abortion protestors typically use still and video cameras to record
images of abortion seekers and clinics and increasingly are implementing new ways to
convey the images such as "live video broadcasts" on the Internet. See Hula, supra note
4.
IN Bloustein, supra note 19, at 984.
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III. INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION
In addition to the public disclosure tort, abortion
seekers may also seek legal redress for the wrongful actions of
anti-abortion protestors under the intrusion upon seclusion
tort. Intrusion upon seclusion is defined as follows: "One who
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. " " An actionable intrusion claim requires
that the plaintiff show: (1) the defendant's intrusion; (2) into a
place of seclusion or plaintiffs private affairs; and (3) that the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.16
There is one case in which the court considered the
intrusion upon seclusion tort in the context of abortion.18 7 In
United States v. Vazquez, s8 plaintiffs, the United States and
the State of Connecticut parens patriae, alleged that
defendant, an anti-abortion protestor, violated the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act.8 9 During discovery in the
litigation, defendant produced videotape footage depicting
clients entering an abortion clinic.' 90 Pursuant to the plaintiffs'
request, the trial judge issued an order temporarily sealing the
videotapes and defendant appealed. 9 ' Plaintiffs argued that
certain tapes identifying clients as they entered the clinic
should remain permanently under seal, preventing public
disclosure in order to protect clients' privacy rights.'12 On
remand from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
district court balanced clinic clients' common law privacy
rights m against the "strongest presumption of [public] access"
18 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652B.
18 See, e.g., Swarthout v. Mut. Serv. Life Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001) (regarding alleged privacy violation where, without plaintiffs
authorization, life insurance company altered plaintiffs medical information release
form in order to receive additional medical information about plaintiff).
187 See discussion supra pp. 332-33 regarding a pending intrusion upon
seclusion lawsuit in the abortion context.
188 31 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Conn. 1998).
189 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
190 Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
191 Id.
'1 Id. at 88.
19 The court also considered, but rejected, plaintiffs' argument that a clinic
client has a constitutional right to privacy "which extends to her travel on a public
street outside of an abortion clinic." Id. at 89.
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
to the videotapes. 194 Although it did not expressly name the
interest as one in seclusion, the court approached plaintiffs'
request in light of the principles underlying intrusion upon
seclusion. The court held that because the clients were filmed
in a public place, plaintiffs did not establish a countervailing
common law right to privacy which would mandate the sealing
of the tapes.195 It reasoned:
[Tihe video cameras captured images of potential patients walking
on a public street as they entered and exited [the clinic]. Thus, any
images filmed by the video camera could also be viewed by members
of the general public who were standing or walking in the vicinity of
the clinic. Moreover, the videos were made out in the open and
during broad daylight.' 96
Thus, the fact that the clinic clients could be publicly
viewed with the naked eye defeated plaintiffs' argument for a
right to privacy. Vazquez demonstrates the strength of a
traditional limitation on the intrusion upon seclusion tort, the
deficiency of a common law right to privacy where the alleged
intrusion occurs in public.' 97
Rather than addressing the intimacy of abortion as a
basis for the right to common law privacy, Vazquez merely
reiterates the limitation on privacy rights in public. However,
an argument can be made for the common law right to public
privacy in this context. Protestors' increasingly frequent use of
surveillance techniques supports this contention.' 98 Indeed, the
Vazquez court suggested, in dicta, that utilizing "ruse or
subterfuge" to record the images of clinic clients may constitute
a violation of clients' common law right to privacy."9 One ploy
anti-abortion protestors used to capture the image of an
abortion seeker rushing to the safety of a clinic was to shout
anti-choice messages, causing the woman to turn in response to
the disturbance, and then snap her picture. Other subterfuge
includes mounting ladders to reach over fences that have been
erected to block the view of clinic parking lots in order to
194 Id. at 88. Specifically, the court explained that public access to the
videotapes is presumed because it provides a check on the judiciary and a way for the
public to evaluate state and federal entities that bring FACE claims. Id.
199 Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
196 Id.
197 Id.
19 Horsley now utilizes video recording devices in addition to cameras. See
Douglas & Myers, supra note 7, at 3.
19 Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
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photograph abortion seekers." Thus, although this Note
advocates more fervently for remedying violations of abortion
seekers' common law privacy under the public disclosure tort, it
also supports a potential remedy under intrusion upon
seclusion.
A. An Analysis of Elements
First, the intrusion upon seclusion tort requires the
plaintiff to show that the defendant committed an intrusion.
Unlike the public disclosure tort which focuses on publicity
given to private facts, the intrusion upon seclusion action
focuses on the means of intrusion.2°1 It follows that the tort is
complete at the moment of intrusion. The intrusion must be
intentional, a requirement which is met where the defendant
"does not believe that he has either the necessary personal
permission or legal authority to do the intrusive act."M The
actionable means of intrusion vary and may include physical
invasion by the defendant" or invasion "by the use of the
defendant's senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee
or overhear the plaintiffs private affairs .... "24 Generally,
physical distance between individuals maintains a state of
inaccessibility, a form of personal privacy.2 However,
surveillance methods may be used to transcend physical
distance and invade an individual's privacy by rendering that
individual accessible to another.
200 Dreazen, supra note 5, at Al.
201 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652B cmt. b; accord Bloustein, supra note
19, at 982 ("Physical intrusion upon a private life and publicity concerning intimate
affairs are simply two different ways of affronting individuality and human dignity.
The difference is only in the means used to threaten the protected interest.") (citing De
May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881), as exemplary of a case in which a single
intimate affair, childbirth, could be the subject of both an intrusion upon seclusion and
a public disclosure of private facts suit)).
22 O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1989).
See De May, 9 N.W. at 147.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652B cmt. b. Where the alleged intrusion
is committed with the use of surveillance technology, courts have held that the
defendant need not have actually viewed the plaintiff. See Harkey v. Abate, 346
N.W.2d 74 (Mich. App. 1983) (holding that plaintiffs privacy was violated where
defendant "installed see-through panels in the ceiling of the [public] restroom which
permitted surreptitious observation from above," notwithstanding plaintiffs lack of
proof that the defendant actually viewed her and her daughter in the restroom).
UNEASYACCESS, supra note 29, at 14.
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Second, the tort requires that the defendant invade the
plaintiffs "solitude" or "seclusion." The plaintiffs private affairs
or intimate concerns may be secluded.2° Private affairs may
include bank accounts, mail or personal documents. 2°7 In
addition, physical spaces commonly associated with privacy
have been considered places of seclusion. Courts have ruled
that a plaintiffs privacy is invaded where the defendant
21209intrudes into her home,2° for example, the plaintiffs den2 or
bedroom. 20 An exemplary case regarding interference with
residential and personal privacy, De May v. Roberts,211 preceded
Warren and Brandeis's prescient article. There, defendant
physician De May allowed his friend, a non-physician, to enter
plaintiffs home and witness the birth of her child without
plaintiffs consent.212  The court found that the plaintiff
possessed a legal right to the privacy of her home.213 Given the
emphasis on physical seclusion as an aspect of privacy, it
follows that courts have held one does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy when in a public place. 4  The
Restatement notes, "there is no liability for . . . observing
[plaintiffl or even taking his photograph while he is walking on
the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and his
appearance is public and open to the public eye."215
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652B cmt. b.
W7 Id.
Violations of residential privacy have been the subject of litigation
concerning abortion providers' rights against'anti-abortion protestors demonstrating
outside their homes. See supra note 54.
M9 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
210 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652B cmt. b, illus. 2.
211 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 149. See infra text accompanying note 218.
214 See Jackson v. Playboy Enter., 574 F. Supp. 10 (D. Ohio 1983) (holding
that because plaintiffs were on a public street at the time the photograph about which
they complained was taken, there was no invasion of privacy); Wilkins v. Nat'l Broad.
Co., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs had no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the patio of a public restaurant with others in the vicinity);
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988) (holding that plaintiffs had no reasonable
expectation of privacy where their photographs were taken with politician in "an open
place" and "in the company of others").
215 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652B cmt. c. This limitation on the tort
action is described in Dean Prosser's Privacy:
On the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no
right to be alone, and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than
follow him about. Neither is it such an invasion to take his photograph
in such a place, since this amounts to nothing more than making a
record.., of a public sight which any one present would be free to see.
Prosser, supra note 9, at 391-92 (citations omitted).
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In addition to showing that the defendant intruded
upon plaintiffs physical seclusion or private affairs, the
plaintiff must establish that the intrusion would be "highly
offensive to a reasonable person."216 The Restatement describes
this standard as connoting a "substantial 217 intrusion. Case
law indicates that the offensiveness of the intrusion is distinct
from, but related to, the seclusion of the plaintiffs physical
person or her private affairs. Where a plaintiff alleges a
violation of particularly personal affairs, courts' reasoning
suggests that this element prevails over the question of
whether the plaintiff was located in a private or public space at
the time of the alleged intrusion. For example, in De May v.
Roberts, regarding the defendant's intrusion upon the birth of
plaintiffs child, the court stated:
[Ilt would be shocking to our sense of right, justice and propriety to
doubt even but that for such an act the law would afford an ample
remedy. To the plaintiff the occasion was a most sacred one and no
one had a right to intrude unless invited or because of some real and
pressing necessity which it is not pretended existed in this case.218
The court's characterization suggests that the real harm in the
case was not that the plaintiffs home was invaded, but that
there was an intrusion upon an intensely personal, private
event. This emphasis is apparent with respect to intrusions on
privacy in public places. In Bennett v. Norban,21 9 an assistant
manager of a shop who suspected the plaintiff of shoplifting
impeded plaintiffs movement, touched her shoulder, directed
her to remove her coat and searched her dress pockets for
merchandise. 22°  The court reasoned that "the angry
performance of defendant's agent was an unreasonable and
serious interference with appellant's desire for anonymity and
an intrusion beyond the limits of decency."221 That the court
found for the plaintiff despite her presence on a "public
highway" during the alleged invasion suggests that the court
gave greater weight to the offensiveness of the intrusion upon
plaintiffs person.2  Thus, courts have overlooked the
216 See, e.g., Swarthout v. Mut. Serv. Life Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001).
217 RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652B cmt. d.
218 De May, 9 N.W. at 148-49 (emphasis added).
219 151 A.2d 476 (Pa. 1959).
Id. at 477.
221 Id. at 479.
= See id.
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traditional "public place" limitation on this tort action in ruling
against defendants who have committed particularly offensive
intrusions upon plaintiffs' affairs.
B. An Argument for Public Privacy
Cases such as Bennett v. Norban illustrate the potential
for an intrusion upon seclusion action to lie, notwithstanding
that the alleged privacy violation occurred in a public place.
This has important implications for abortion seekers who are
surveilled on public property around a family planning clinic.
Indeed, the Restatement issues a caveat to the limitation on
actions for intrusion in public places: "Even in a public place,
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff...
that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be
invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these
matters."" Andrew Jay McClurg advocates for recognizing an
intrusion tort action where the public intrusion would be
particularly offensive to a reasonable person.2" McClurg
suggests privileging the "offensiveness" requirement above the
fact of the plaintiffs physical location at the time of the alleged
invasion.225 However, this modified inquiry is better understood
as an emphasis on the intimacy of the plaintiffs affairs.
Moving away from the limiting notion of the plaintiffs physical
seclusion, McClurg emphasizes the Restatement definition of
"seclusion" which includes "intrusions upon a person's 'private
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 652B cmt. c. The Restatement adopted this
language from the classic case of Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474
(Ala. 1964), in which plaintiff prevailed on her intrusion upon seclusion claim against
the newspaper that published a photograph of her which revealed her undergarments,
despite the fact that she was in public at a fun-house when the photograph was taken.
McClurg, supra note 37.
McClurg suggests a test for applying allegations of public privacy
violations to the intrusion upon seclusion tort. Id. at 1058. This test combines some
elements of the public disclosure and intrusion upon seclusion branches. Although the
relatedness of the two branches is apparent from the fact that plaintiffs frequently
plead both causes of action in one case, this Note will utilize only McClurg's argument
for public privacy under intrusion upon seclusion. See also Paton-Simpson, supra note
153, at 321 (arguing that, because the right to privacy is a matter of degree, individuals
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy even in public). Notably, Paton-Simpson
cites United States v. Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Conn. 1998), as an example of a
case in which the right to public privacy would be appropriate. Paton-Simpson, supra
note 153, at 313.
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affairs or concerns."2 6 He argues that this conception "is broad
enough to include intrusions in public places."2 By focusing
the inquiry on private matters which a plaintiff secludes from
the public, McClurg centralizes the plaintiffs privacy interest.
McClurg then defines a person's private concern as her "ability
to move about in a public place without being followed,
photographed, or videotaped."m He offers the example of
intrusion by an anti-abortion protestor upon an abortion
seeker's solitude by videotaping or photographing her in the
clinic vicinity.m He argues that "even brief observations may
seriously invade a person's private information preserve....
Though [a protestor's intrusion] may be brief in duration, it
obviously captures an extremely intimate fact about the person
filmed: that she is getting or considering an abortion."m
Although it concerned constitutional law, the court's analysis of
intrusion in Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue231  is
pertinent. There, the court considered whether private actors
could be enjoined from videotaping abortion seekers in the
clinic vicinity based on the women's constitutional right to
privacy. The court suggested, in dicta:
It is unavoidable that, in exercising her right to have an abortion, a
woman must momentarily travel on a public sidewalk or street in
order to get to the doctor's office. However, this fact should not allow
defendants to freely intrude upon a woman's right to privacy. What
is particularly bothersome is that when the intruder is an individual
rather than the government, the use of the photographs and
videotapes is left to the sole discretion of the intruder with no concern
for the well-being of the woman.2
McClurg, supra note 37, at 1055 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977)).
Id. at 1055.
The emphasis on technology is significant: McClurg asserts that a possible
distinction between actionable and non-actionable instances of intrusion lies in the use
of camera and video recording devices versus the naked eye. Id. at 1041. The use of
technology is particularly offensive in that it enables the intruder to form a permanent
record of the plaintiffs private affair. Id. at 1042; accord Paton-Simpson, supra note
153, at 321 (asserting that "[a] rogue factor that not only disrupts normal expectations
of public privacy but also undermines the distinction between public and private places
is the use of privacy-invasive technologies").
m McClurg, supra note 37, at 1033.
=0 Id. (citing Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr.
194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), in which plaintiffs sued protestors for invasion of privacy
under the California Constitution and invoked a right to public privacy).
231 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1438 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
= Id. (emphasis added).
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Although the court declined to enjoin defendants' use of
cameras based on the lack of precedent,m its pronouncement
indicates the potential for abortion seekers' right to public
privacy. This analysis of public privacy suggests that an
abortion may be deemed a "private concern," although
procurement requires a woman to traverse public space, and
thus the abortion seeker should be protected from tortious
intrusion by another.
Another approach indicates a shift toward recognizing
privacy rights in public. According to this analysis, courts
qualify the standard of reasonableness and endorse an
expectation of privacy that is not complete. In Sanders v.
American Broadcasting Companies,' plaintiff employee
claimed that a co-worker, by videotaping and recording
workplace conversations, intruded upon his seclusion and thus
invaded his privacy. The court analyzed the extent to which a
person may reasonably expect privacy in the workplace:
[Pirivacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-or-
nothing characteristic. There are degrees and nuances to societal
recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact the privacy one
expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not render
the expectation unreasonable as a matter of law.'
Significantly, the court expanded the right of public privacy by
stating that "mass media videotaping may constitute an
intrusion even when the events and communications recorded
were visible and audible to some limited set of observers at the
time they occurred."2 An emphasis on technology has
compelled courts to reconceive and expand the scope of
actionable intrusions into individual privacy.
In sum, courts should afford an abortion seeker a
remedy for intrusion upon the intimate affair of her abortion by
protestors who scrutinize her activity at a reproductive health
services clinic. The success of this action would likely depend
2M Id. at 1437.
234 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
M Id. at 72.
2M Id. (citing Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)
(finding a triable issue of fact with respect to the reasonableness of an accident victim's
expectation of privacy where a television producer recorded the victim's conversation
with the rescue nurse, but the record was unclear as to whether the general public
overheard the conversation)). See supra note 228 regarding intrusion and technology.
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upon a recognition of a right to privacy in public. Courts should
recognize this right to privacy in public where the intrusion
concerns a particularly intimate affair such as abortion, the
intrusion upon which would be objectively highly offensive.
CONCLUSION
This Note argues that abortion seekers have a common
law right to privacy arising under the principles described by
Warren and Brandeis in The Right to Privacy.237 A woman may
vindicate her right to privacy in a lawsuit against anti-abortion
protestors who have disclosed the fact of her abortion. A court's
conclusion that an abortion is a private, intimate matter, like
one's medical information and sexual orientation, should
prevail over any First Amendment defense offered by the
individual or entity who gives publicity to the abortion. Under
the intrusion upon seclusion tort, an abortion seeker may also
sue an anti-abortion protestor for invasion of privacy where the
demonstrator has scrutinized or created a photographic record
of her presence at an abortion clinic. Here, courts should
recognize the countervailing offensiveness of the intrusion into
a matter as personal as abortion to transcend the traditional
"public forum" limitation on the tort action. Acknowledging this
right is particularly important in light of the increasing
inventiveness of surveillance technology which anti-abortion
protestors use as a tentacular means of intrusion.
Recognizing a remedy for abortion seekers under the
invasion of privacy tort will vindicate women's reproductive
autonomy. This Note has adopted a functionalist theory of
privacy and defined common law privacy in terms of autonomy.
Non-disclosure and seclusion are forms of personal privacy that
may promote reproductive autonomy. This is a familiar scheme
within constitutional privacy jurisprudence involving abortion
rightsm and is an incarnation of Warren and Brandeis's "right
to be let alone." 9 The common law remedies for which this
Note advocates uniquely define and defend a woman's right to
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8.
See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 195.
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personal privacy as against invasive anti-abortion protest
activity and facilitate reproductive self-determination.
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